2. Consider a two period game where an incumbent monopolist in an industry fears entry in the
second period. The demand for the product is given by P = 100-
Q, where Q is the total quantity
produced in the market. Suppose the incumbent has a marginal cost of $24, while the entrant has
inal cost of $38. In addition, each firm incurs a fixed cost of $200 in each period that it is
in business. The incumbent monopolist can either charge a monopoly price in period 1 or a limit
price. In period 2 the incumbent monopolist can again charge eith
er a limit price or an
accommodating price. The potential entrant firm has two strategies: either to enter or stay out at
the beginning of period 2 after observing the price charged by the incumbent in period 1.
a) Construct the extensive form of the g
ame described above.
b) Compute the payoffs at each terminal node making the same assumption about the limit price
as was made in class. The first number at each terminal node should be the total profit of the
incumbent computed over the two periods. The second number should be the profit of the entrant.
c) Find out the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. Write down the strategy of each
player carefully that gives rise to the SPNE keeping in mind that a strategy must specify an action
at each n
ode that a player may be called upon to play. Why doesnâ€t an incumbent want to charge
a limit price in this game?
d) In reality we do see firms charging a limit price or a predatory price. What can account for this
behavior despite the opposite prediction
of the above model?
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